

51.61

SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Yugoslavia

DATE DISTR. 28 November 1952

SUBJECT Political Information

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE
ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS. ²
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.
ACQUIRED

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

50X1-HUM

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1-HUM

THIS DOCUMENT HAS AN ENCLOSURE ATTACHED-
DO NOT DETACH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

[illegible]

OCI x

SECURITY INFORMATION

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
DO NOT DETACH

SECRET CONTROL
U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

8

Subject: Tito's True Face

The conflict between Stalin and Tito is not of ideological origin at all, as it is often assumed, but of an exclusively political character. It is a question of rivalry, that is the question whether Stalin or Tito has to dictate in Yugoslavia.

The situation of the Yugoslav peoples is - consequently - worse than that of any other people subjugated by Communism, because the Yugoslavs have been defrauded (deprived) even of the hope of freedom; the anti-Communist attitude of the West which encourages the Satellites and even the Russian people, has no meaning for the Yugoslavs.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] the
chiefs of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party have explained (justified) their attitude in the following way:

" Our present tactic will save a Communist fortress - namely the Yugoslav one - even if the Bolshevik system is completely destroyed in the next war. Our slogan "the national Communism" has lulled to sleep the anti-Communist vigilance of the world bourgeoisie. Our policy - which is recognized as legal and legitimate by the western Powers - will easier break the protective front that the West has organized against Soviet Communism. If our tactical principle, the "national Communism," is accepted by the satellite peoples, it will weaken the opposition of the

SECRET CONTROL

U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

9

opposition of the reactionary forces whose action is based not only on the hate of the western peoples against Communism but also - and perhaps even more - on their hate against Russian oppression. By displacing (moving) the center of world Communism from Moscow to Belgrade, that is ^{to} a European center, we will facilitate the penetration of Marxist ideology into the European masses which are today exasperated by their atavistic terror of Russian imperialism. Our conception of the global tactic of Communism will triumph even in Moscow's Politbureau when - after Stalin's death - we will be able to present ourselves militarily and politically strong. "

It seems useful to analyze thoroughly this last point, which is of the utmost importance. Tito is convinced that as long as Stalin lives there is no possibility of reconciliation whatsoever; nevertheless, he has not abandoned his idea - the idea which is active now - of becoming one of the main leaders of the Third International. Tito has only delayed his plan. When his plan is known, his relations with the nations of the Atlantic Pact appear quite clearly. Namely, Tito does not intend - as the western Allies believe - to strengthen the position of Greece and Turkey, and he does not intend to divide Albania between Yugoslavia and Greece. Tito's Balkanic policy is plainly and essentially anti-Greek. He considers that Albania belongs to him, and he wants to incorporate it integrally (completely) to Yugoslavia as a new republic of the Yugoslav federation. Furthermore, he has not renounced to

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

10

his plan of uniting Greek Macedonia to the Macedonian Yugoslav republic. In the past, he had already planned - together with the late Georgi Dimitrov - a common Bulgaro-Yugoslav action against Greece, which as a western, democratic, and liberal nation does not fit with the political conceptions of the Yugoslav dictator. Armed to the teeth with American arms, Tito wants to intimidate the Yugoslav Communists and compel them to obey with submission; at the same time, he wants to break (weaken) the resistance of the Yugoslav nationalists, and create a strong army to present it to the Soviets at the opportune moment.

When this background is known, it is not difficult to prove that the most valuable argument of the Westerners - by which they justify their help to the Titoist government - is not very convincing, namely the Yugoslav military aid in case of an armed conflict against the Soviets. In such case, there is no regime, government, or chief of state in the whole world who is more afraid than Tito of the war. All the nationalists and the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslavs are waiting only for such a moment to eliminate the Communist officers and take refuge to the mountains. On the other hand, the Communist minority knows very well that in case of war it has to pay with its own blood its insubordination to Moscow. Furthermore, this minority is convinced that the American war help will be of a rather academic (ideal, moral) nature, and will anyway come too late; this conviction is based on the experience concerning the promises made during the past war to

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

11

Poland, Yugoslavia, etc.; the promises in question did not materialize. Consequently, the Yugoslav Communist forces will try to justify themselves before the invading Red Army, and from the very first moment they will endeavor to join, with their units, the aggressor. As long as Tito is not successful in convincing the Yugoslav Communists that his tactic is orthodox in the Marxist sense, he shall remain with but a few faithfuls tied (linked) to him by common interests and fear.

If the war breaks out before Stalin's death or before the conclusion of an accord between Tito and Moscow, he does not even think to defend himself. Actually, all his activities are dominated by prudent provisions which shall secure to himself and his faithfuls a safe and undisturbed retreat toward the Adriatic coast. To this end, magazines of food stuff, arms, and munitions, as well as fortifications on the Islands of Korčula, Vis, and Cherso (sic - Tr. rem.: May be it is Cres) are already prepared for Tito and his intimate friends; they intend to take refuge there, under the protection of the American fleet. There is no true line of defense against the aggressor, and even if there were one, in case of war, Tito could not find anybody ready to defend it. All the plans of his Staff are made only to delude (deceive) the Americans.

All the heavy armament given by the Americans to the Yugoslav dictator can be already considered as Soviet war booty. It is not only a question that Tito will not fight, but by backing him the Americans are neutralizing a

U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

12

a courageous and distinctly anti-Communist people; under any kind of anti-Communist regime, the Yugoslavs would fight to the death for their own national cause. The Westerners are repeating a grave error against Yugoslavia; namely, during the Second World War, the Axis committed an error by creating Pavelic's Croatian state, intending to use its 15 divisions; however, it turned ^{out} later that the Axis had to send ^{own} in Croatia 20 of its own divisions to protect Pavelic against his ^{own} people. The same and identical situation expects the Americans who are relying on Tito's 40 imaginary divisions. If Tito ever succeeds in organizing some defense, it will only be if he succeeds to convince the Yugoslav Communists that he is working for their aims; but, not a single nationalist will ever fight under his command.

50X1-HUM

What the West should expect in case of war is revealed in the following resolution of the Yugoslav Politbureau,

" If an armed conflict should flare up, we, the Communists, since we are in a military sector of the utmost importance, should try to remain neutral. In this manner, we will guarantee to the Soviets the safety of their flank. Even if we enter into the war, we can join the Communist world at the most critical moment by just changing the steersman, Tito, thus deciding the fate of the war. "

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

13

Even with his present policy, Tito is a dangerous enemy of the West; because his policy serves Stalin's plans, Tito would like to prolong indefinitely the cold war. In fact, if the tension between West and East quiets down, nobody would have any more use for Tito, and he would be kicked out by his own people after a few days. The same thing would happen even more quickly in case of a war. The prolongation of the cold war prolongs the physical and political existence of Tito. That is why the Yugoslav dictator backs up the so called "Third Force" and the neutral block; his activities are very intense in this field, and especially so among the Asiatic peoples. He holds up the beam (backs up) the labourist dissident Bevan as well as the Indian chief Nehru, while his diplomatic mission to Tehran numbers not less than thirty persons. This neutral block does not deprive the Soviets of a single satellite, but tends to paralyze India and the whole Middle East, and to diminish the moral resistance of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and all that to the detriment of the United States.

On the other hand, Tito is the weakest of all the red dictators of the world. It is true that also the other red dictators have against them the overwhelming majority of their own peoples, but they have at least the valid support of their respective communist parties, which are the true masters of the "people's democracies." As for Tito, beside the implacable hatred of the people, he has against himself also the majority of the Yugoslav Commu-

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

14

nists. In the field of international policies, the other red dictators fear the West, but they can count on the complete support of Stalin. Tito, instead, has no guarantee that the West is ready to enter into a world war because of him. The other Communist countries could oppose a certain resistance, but ^{if /} ~~if~~ Yugoslavia is attacked, the immediate fall, not to say the liquidation, of the Titoist army would inevitably follow. Faced by the Soviet troops, the Yugoslav soldiers would flee, because they do not want to defend one sort of Communism against the other, nor do they want to associate themselves with either of them. And on the other hand, any western army - the Italian one included - would be received by the whole Yugoslav people as liberator. The greatest danger for the Westerners lies in the fact that - relying on the Yugoslav defense (resistance) - they do not take sufficient care of the defense of the eastern Italian border.

SECRET CONTROL
U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied